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We live in a data-rich age. But Fourth Amendment doctrines have failed to
adapt to our current reality. Legal principles that evolved to cabin the scope of physical searches seldom constrain searches of digital devices. As a result, a warrant to
search a digital device gives police officers unfettered access to all of our information.
While many scholars have argued that courts should address this problem by adopting rules that directly limit the scope of digital searches, this Comment argues that
some courts have already eschewed this approach in favor of rules that encourage
legislatures to regulate digital searches. Legislative regulation of digital searches is
preferable because the legislative branch is better equipped to deal with a rapidly
evolving technological landscape. Unfortunately, however, courts have not gone
about incentivizing legislative action effectively. This Article posits that if courts
want to encourage legislatures to act, they should adopt a penalty default rule that
disadvantages the police. Specifically, courts should temporarily ban the plain view
doctrine during searches of digital devices until legislatures limit the scope of digital
searches.

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 1396
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PERMITS OVERLY BROAD DIGITAL SEARCHES .. 1399
A. The Fourth Amendment Limits the Scope of Physical Searches.... 1400
B. Fourth Amendment Doctrines Fail to Limit the Scope of Digital
Searches ............................................................................................. 1402
1. The Particularity Clause does not limit the scope of warrants
to search digital devices. ............................................................ 1402
2. Police procedures have evolved to give officers the time and
tools to look through all the data on a digital device. .............. 1404

† AB 2016, Brown University; JD Candidate 2021, The University of Chicago Law
School. Thanks to The University of Chicago Law Review editors and Professor Lior
Strahilevitz for their helpful advice on this Comment.

1395

1396

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1395

3.

The plain view doctrine, when applied to digital searches, is
no longer a narrow exception to the warrant requirement...... 1405
C. Analyzing the Constitutionality of Digital Searches....................... 1406
II. TWO WAYS COURTS CAN APPROACH DIGITAL SEARCHES: FIRST- AND
SECOND-ORDER REGULATIONS ................................................................... 1408
A. First- and Second-Order Regulations............................................... 1408
B. Default Rules as a Type of Second-Order Regulation ..................... 1410
1. Placeholder default rules. .......................................................... 1411
2. Penalty default rules.................................................................. 1411
III. THE JUDICIAL EMBRACE OF SECOND-ORDER REGULATION ......................... 1412
A. Courts Want Legislatures to Regulate Digital Searches ................ 1413
B. Courts Have Adopted Default Rules to Encourage Legislative
Action ................................................................................................. 1417
1. Pyramidal search process for searching a digital device. ........ 1417
2. Time spent looking at nonresponsive files. ............................... 1418
3. Second warrant requirement..................................................... 1420
IV. HOW COURTS SHOULD ENCOURAGE NONJUDICIAL REGULATION OF
DIGITAL SEARCHES ..................................................................................... 1421
A. Penalty Default Rules Encourage Nonjudicial Policymaking ........ 1422
B. Existing Digital Search Default Rules Will Not Lead to
Legislation ......................................................................................... 1424
C. Why the Legislature Should Regulate Digital Searches ................. 1427
D. Salvaging the Second-Order Approach ............................................ 1430
1. Courts can eliminate the plain view doctrine for digital
searches. ..................................................................................... 1430
2. Eliminating the plain view doctrine for digital searches is
desirable. .................................................................................... 1433
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 1435

INTRODUCTION
Paul is the subject of an investigation into tax fraud. Law enforcement officials believe that he participated in a scheme that
defrauded the government of a significant amount of money. As
part of the investigation, officers obtain a warrant to search
Paul’s home for evidence of this scheme. The warrant gives the
officers the ability to search all of Paul’s electronic documents and
files for evidence of the crime. When the officers arrive to execute
the warrant, they copy all of the data from Paul’s laptops, external hard drives, phones, and tablets. The copied devices contain
all of Paul’s emails, phones, documents, text messages, and
browsing history. The data show officers where Paul was on any
given day, how long he spent looking at a given website, and what
files he deleted. All of this information is taken to a police station
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where forensic experts spend weeks looking through data from
Paul’s devices. While the warrant only authorizes officers to look
for evidence of tax fraud, the experts look at every file, photo, text,
or website on that computer—even though evidence of tax fraud
would likely be in a Word document or PDF. The officers find evidence of Paul’s tax evasion, but they also find evidence that he
illegally purchased marijuana and viewed pirated Game of
Thrones episodes. This additional evidence results in new criminal charges.1
Instinctually, the officers’ expansive search of Paul’s devices
feels intrusive and unnecessarily invasive. Most Americans probably think that the Fourth Amendment should prevent officers
from seizing all of a suspect’s data and rummaging through it for
evidence of a crime.
But while we may think that these police practices should be
unconstitutional, that is not necessarily true. The Fourth Amendment, as it has traditionally been applied to physical searches,
does little to limit the scope of a search of a digital device.2 Constitutional doctrines that limit the scope of physical searches have
not effectively adapted to the rapid pace of technological change.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence evolved to regulate searches of
physical spaces, which can store only so much information. Digital devices, however, are able to contain amounts of data that
would be impossible to casually store in an analog form. For example, one terabyte of data is analogous to all the books in a
twelve-story library.3 This storage capacity was inconceivable a
generation ago. 4 Now, it is commonplace. Fourth Amendment
doctrines that evolved to constrain the scope of a search of a
house have not adapted to similarly constrain a search of digital
libraries.
Faced with this emerging problem, courts could take one of
two regulatory approaches: (1) regulate police behavior by giving
officers a set of rules to follow, or (2) issue decisions that

1
While Paul is fictional, this example is based on the facts of United States v
Burgess, 576 F3d 1078, 1082–84 (10th Cir 2009) (upholding a conviction for child pornography charges based on a search pursuant to a warrant for images of drug trafficking).
2
For a discussion of why the Fourth Amendment fails to effectively limit the scope
of digital searches, see Part I.B.
3
See Paul Ohm, Response, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power
of Magistrate Judges, 97 Va L Rev Brief 1, 6 (2011).
4
See Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U Pa L
Rev 373, 391 (2014).

1398

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1395

encourage the executive or legislative branches to address the
problem.5 These two approaches are called first- and second-order
regulations, respectively. 6 Most of the scholarship on digital
searches has focused on how courts should reduce the scope of
digital searches through first-order regulation. For example, commentators have argued that magistrate judges should prescribe
digital search procedures in a warrant,7 impose use restrictions
on data, 8 and alter how warrant exceptions apply to digital
searches.9 This Comment takes a different approach by focusing
on the second type of judicial regulation: how courts can incentivize legislatures to regulate digital searches.
First, this Comment shows that many federal courts have already eschewed first-order regulation in favor of encouraging legislative action. However, I argue that courts are attempting to
spur legislative action the wrong way. Specifically, judges have
undercut their pleas for legislative intervention by crafting rules
that reflect existing police practices.10 Regulators are not incentivized to propose alternatives when the existing rules do little to
change police behavior. But without some policymaking intervention, the privacy-invasive status quo will persist: suspects like
Paul will continue to experience intrusive digital searches that
would be unconstitutional in other contexts.
If courts really want to motivate legislative change, they will
have to take more drastic steps by adopting penalty default rules.
Penalty default rules are rules that disadvantage certain parties
to encourage those parties or other third parties (in this case,

5
See John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 Cal L Rev
205, 213–14 (2015).
6
Id.
7
See Emily Berman, Digital Searches, the Fourth Amendment, and the Magistrates’
Revolt, 68 Emory L J 49, 82–93 (2018); Ohm, Response, 97 Va L Rev Brief at 11–12 (cited
in note 3). But see generally Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and
Seizure, 96 Va L Rev 1241 (2010) (arguing that imposition of such procedures by magistrate judges is unconstitutional and unwise).
8
See generally Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence: The Case for
Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 Tex Tech L Rev 1 (2015).
9
See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv L Rev 531,
582–84 (2005); Andrew Vahid Moshirnia, Note, Separating Hard Fact from Hard Drive: A
Solution for Plain View Doctrine in the Digital Domain, 23 Harv J L & Tech 609, 626–33
(2010). But see David J.S. Ziff, Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Execution
of Computer Searches Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 Colum L Rev 841,
853–61 (2005).
10 See Part IV.B.
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legislators) to act.11 Historically, default rules that penalize the
police have been effective at causing legislatures to enact laws
that regulate criminal procedure. 12 This Comment argues that
courts should learn from these successes and temporarily prohibit
officers from invoking the plain view doctrine when searching a
digital device until policymakers promulgate regulations that
limit the scope of digital searches.
Part I explains why the Fourth Amendment, as it has traditionally been applied to physical searches, does little to limit the
scope of digital searches. As a result, courts have had to fashion
new rules to limit the scope of digital searches. Part II explains
that courts can pursue two different regulatory strategies: (1) regulating police conduct directly, or (2) trying to incentivize legislatures to craft those regulations. Part III applies this framework
to digital searches and argues that courts are trying to spur legislative regulation. But, as Part IV explains, courts are not going
about this in the most effective way; instead, courts should adopt
a penalty default rule that better incentivizes policymakers to
limit the scope of digital searches.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PERMITS OVERLY BROAD
DIGITAL SEARCHES
Today, digital devices are ubiquitous in everyday life. Be it a
cell phone, a laptop, a smartwatch, or some other form of technology, many Americans have a digital device on them at all times.13
We use our devices almost constantly, and each time we do, we
leave a small trail of data behind.14 As Justice Sonia Sotomayor
cautioned, our data “reflect[ ] a wealth of detail about [our] familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”15 If
stitched together, the information on our devices can paint a very

11 See Tara Mikkilineni, Note, Constitutional Default Rules and Interbranch Cooperation, 82 NYU L Rev 1403, 1409–10 (2007). Hadley v Baxendale, 156 Eng Rep 145 (Ex
1854), exemplifies the idea: the court imposed a rule that makes a party in breach of a
contract liable for foreseeable damages only in order to incentivize the party harmed by
the breach to disclose potential damages in contract negotiations.
12 See Part IV.A.
13 Consumers in the United States, for example, look at their smartphones an average of fifty-two times per day. See Global Mobile Consumer Survey, US Edition *2
(Deloitte, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/CYS5-9XRU.
14 Consider Jacqueline Howard, Americans Devote More than Ten Hours a Day to
Screen Time, and Growing (CNN, July 29, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/X9E2-3LU3.
15 United States v Jones, 565 US 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor concurring).
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intimate picture of our lives—and digital devices are capable of
storing vast amounts of information.
Searching a suspect’s computer or phone has become a routine part of many modern criminal investigations.16 But once an
officer has a warrant to search a digital device, there are few safeguards that prevent officers from sifting through all of a suspect’s
data to find something incriminating. This Part explains why
Fourth Amendment doctrine, as it has been applied to physical
searches, fails to appropriately limit the scope of digital searches.
A. The Fourth Amendment Limits the Scope of Physical
Searches
The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to
be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”17 When the
Framers drafted this phrase, the type of search they aimed to prohibit was a search pursuant to a “general warrant.” This type of
document, widely reviled, “allowed British officers to rummage
through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal
activity.”18 To ensure that such general, probing searches would
not be possible in the new republic, the Framers adopted the
Fourth Amendment. Consistent with the Framers’ aim, courts
have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to place limits on an officer’s ability to conduct a generalized search of a physical space.
One way that the Fourth Amendment limits the scope of a
physical search is by requiring an officer to obtain a warrant before beginning a search. A search is presumptively unreasonable
if it is conducted without a warrant.19 In order for a warrant to be
valid, it must satisfy three constitutional criteria: (1) it must be
supported by “probable cause”; (2) it must contain an officer’s
“[o]ath or affirmation”; and (3) it must “particularly describ[e] the
16 Consider H. Marshall Jarrett, et al, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations *ix (Department of Justice, 2009),
archived at https://perma.cc/MLW8-8FH4.
17 US Const Amend IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
18 Carpenter v United States, 138 S Ct 2206, 2213 (2018), quoting Riley v California,
573 US 373, 403 (2014).
19 Kentucky v King, 563 US 452, 459 (2011), citing Brigham City v Stuart, 547 US
398, 403 (2006). There are numerous exceptions to this rule, such as the exigency exception
and the automobile exception. See Missouri v McNeely, 569 US 141, 148–49 (2013) (discussing the scope of the exigency exception); California v Acevedo, 500 US 565, 579–80
(1991) (discussing the scope of the automobile exception). In these situations, a warrant is
not required. However, this Comment focuses exclusively on the legal limitations on digital searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.
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place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”20 The
last requirement—contained in the Particularity Clause—invalidates warrants that either fail to specify the items that will be
seized or provide such a general description that the warrant
sweeps in innocuous items.21
The Particularity Clause limits the scope of an officer’s
search because an officer can only search for the items listed in
the warrant. If an officer looks for items not listed in the warrant,
the officer is conducting a warrantless search, which is presumed
to be unconstitutional. That means that an officer can only look
in places where the items listed in a warrant could reasonably be
found.22 For example, an officer with a warrant to search a home
for a stolen flat-screen television could only search in the places
where that television would likely be found. A television cannot
fit in a shoebox or a dresser drawer, so the officer could not open
either container under the terms of the warrant.23 As a result, the
description in the warrant prevents officers from using warrants
to engage in extensive searches for incriminating evidence.
Of course, during an otherwise lawful search, an officer may
find incriminating evidence that is not listed in the warrant.
When this happens, the officer is not required to turn a blind eye
but instead can seize the evidence pursuant to the plain view doctrine.24 Under the plain view doctrine, an officer can only seize
evidence if he or she: (1) sees the evidence from a place where the
officer is legally allowed to be; (2) is able to access the evidence
legally; and (3) immediately realizes that the evidence is incriminating.25 In other words, the plain view doctrine is “not [ ] an independent ‘exception’ to the Warrant Clause, but simply [ ] an extension of whatever the prior justification for an officer’s ‘access
to an object’ may be.”26 Therefore, for physical searches at least,
the plain view doctrine only applies in the limited set of

20

US Const Amend IV.
See United States v Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars and
Fifty-Seven Cents, 307 F3d 137, 149 (3d Cir 2002).
22 See United States v Ross, 456 US 798, 824 (1982).
23 See id (“[P]robable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a
garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom.”).
24 See Horton v California, 496 US 128, 133 (1990).
25 Id at 136–37.
26 Texas v Brown, 460 US 730, 738–39 (1983) (Rehnquist) (plurality).
21

1402

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1395

circumstances when an officer discovers new evidence while
searching for the items that were specified in the warrant.27
In sum, the Fourth Amendment has evolved over time to significantly limit the scope of a physical search. Its Particularity
Clause restricts what an officer can look for when conducting a
search pursuant to a warrant, and the plain view exception was
crafted to be a narrow exception to this rule.
B. Fourth Amendment Doctrines Fail to Limit the Scope of
Digital Searches
Although Fourth Amendment doctrines limit the scope of
physical searches, the Particularity Clause and plain view exception have failed to have the same restrictive effect for digital
searches. An officer with a warrant to search a digital device may
look through all the data on a computer irrespective of what the
warrant includes and seize anything that is incriminating. This
Section discusses three problems with the current state of the
doctrine.
1. The Particularity Clause does not limit the scope of
warrants to search digital devices.
When the Particularity Clause is applied to digital searches,
it does little to limit where an officer can search. As discussed
previously, the Particularity Clause limits the scope of an officer’s
search because the officer can only search in the places where the
evidence listed in the warrant is likely to be. But when an officer
applies for a warrant to search a digital device, the description of
what will be searched and seized is often general. Typically, warrants merely state the type of devices an officer plans to search,
the format the digital evidence might be in (for example, a photo

27 The plain view doctrine was intended to be a narrow exception to the warrant
requirement. Its creation was driven by practical necessity. Without the plain view doctrine, an officer who finds incriminating evidence that is not listed in a warrant would
have to stop searching and leave the scene to get a second warrant. The resulting delay
jeopardizes both the officer’s safety and the integrity of the evidence.
But at the same time, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement prohibits
generalized searches for incriminating evidence. An overly broad plain view exception
would swallow the need for a warrant. Therefore, in crafting the plain view exception, the
Supreme Court aimed to strike a balance between a pragmatic concern about policing and
a desire to protect the privacy of those being searched. See Coolidge v New Hampshire,
403 US 443, 467–78 (1971) (Stewart) (plurality).
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or text file), and what crime the evidence will help prove.28 For
example, in United States v Mann,29 officers obtained a warrant
that allowed them to search a home for “video tapes, CD’s or other
digital media, computers, and the contents of said computers,
tapes, or other electronic media, to search for images of women in
locker rooms or other private areas.”30
Courts allow for this level of generality because they recognize that more specificity is often impossible—it is just too difficult for an officer to know in advance what the incriminating files
will be named or where those files will be on the hard drive.31
Even seemingly reasonable limitations (such as restricting a warrant in a child pornography case to only include visual media) are
impractical. For example, if a warrant only permitted an officer
to search for image files, a suspect could easily evade a search
pursuant to that warrant by saving images in documents.32 Due
to these challenges, courts consistently grant warrants to search
an entire digital device. While courts recognize that a probing examination of every piece of data on a computer is in tension with
the Particularity Clause, they acknowledge the practical necessity of permitting such a search. 33 Because digital devices are

28 See, for example, United States v Perez, 2015 WL 3498734, *1 (ED Pa) (“A warrant
authorizing the search for and seizure of, inter alia, all ‘visual depictions’ of child pornography ‘on whatever medium,’ and documents, emails, records, notes, and other materials
related to child pornography, was subsequently issued.”).
29 592 F3d 779 (7th Cir 2010).
30 Id at 780–81.
31 See, for example, id at 782 (“The problem with . . . computer searches lies in the
fact that such images could be nearly anywhere on the computers. . . . [C]omputer files
may be manipulated to hide their true contents.”); United States v Hill, 459 F3d 966, 978
(9th Cir 2006) (“Images can be hidden in all manner of files, even word processing documents and spreadsheets. Criminals will do all they can to conceal contraband, including
the simple expedient of changing the names and extensions of files to disguise their content from the casual observer.”).
32 See also United States v Williams, 592 F3d 511, 522 (4th Cir 2010) (“To be effective, [a digital] search could not be limited to reviewing only the files’ designation or labeling, because the designation or labeling of files on a computer can easily be manipulated
to hide their substance.”).
33 See, for example, United States v Upham, 168 F3d 532, 535 (1st Cir 1999) (finding
that, “[a]s a practical matter, the seizure and subsequent off-premises search of [a] computer . . . [i]s about the narrowest definable search and seizure reasonably likely to obtain
the [evidence]”); United States v Perez, 712 F Appx 136, 139–40 (3d Cir 2017) (noting that
courts have struggled to apply the particularity requirement to digital searches, but nonetheless upholding a search of all computer equipment found at a particular address);
United States v Stabile, 633 F3d 219, 237 (3d Cir 2011) (discussing how broad searches of
hard drives may be necessary to combat attempts to conceal criminal activity, but noting
that “granting the Government a carte blanche to search every file on the hard drive impermissibly transforms a limited search into a general one”) (quotation marks omitted);
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such rich sources of evidence, courts are unwilling to conclude
that warrants to search entire digital devices violate the Particularity Clause.34 As a result, a warrant to search a digital device
often gives an officer complete access to search everything on that
device.
2. Police procedures have evolved to give officers the time
and tools to look through all the data on a digital device.
In theory, this broad access would not pose a threat to privacy
if police departments were searching digital devices the same way
that they search physical spaces. But the way officers search
physical spaces doesn’t work for digital devices. As a result, officers have adopted a different set of search protocols for digital
searches that give officers the ability to search through all the
data they seize.
When officers search physical spaces, they go to the location
listed in the warrant and search that site for evidence. For example, the police might go to an office and stay at that office until
they search through all the documents for evidence of tax fraud.35
An officer cannot follow the same procedure when searching a
computer. Computers can store billions of pages of information.36
Reading through all that information would take weeks.37
United States v Richards, 659 F3d 527, 538–40 (6th Cir 2011) (explaining that “federal
courts have rejected most particularity challenges to warrants authorizing the seizure and
search of entire personal or business computers”). But see United States v Galpin, 720 F3d
436, 447–48 (2d Cir 2013) (finding that a warrant to search a digital device was overbroad
because it allowed for the seizure of materials unrelated to the criminal offense specified
in the warrant).
34 See, for example, Upham, 168 F3d at 535 (upholding a warrant that authorized
the search of “any and all computer software and hardware” found at a particular location); Williams, 592 F3d at 522 (stating that a computer search “must, by implication,
authorize at least a cursory review of each file on the computer”); Mann, 592 F3d at 782–
83 (upholding a search warrant for an entire computer because the materials sought in
the warrant “could be essentially anywhere on the computer”); Hill, 459 F3d at 973 (same);
United States v Burgess, 576 F3d 1078, 1092–93 (10th Cir 2009) (recognizing Fourth
Amendment concerns implicated by computer searches, but explaining that “a computer
search may be as extensive as reasonably required to locate the items described in the
warrant’’).
35 See, for example, United States v Hillyard, 677 F2d 1336, 1338–39 (9th Cir 1982)
(describing a warrant issued in an investigation for stolen vehicles that authorized police
to “search all motor vehicles and heavy equipment found on [defendant’s] premises”).
36 Ohm, Response, 97 Va L Rev Brief at 6 (cited in note 3).
37 See FRCrP 41(e)(2), Advisory Committee’s Notes to the 2009 Amendment (“Computers and other electronic storage media commonly contain such large amounts of information that it is often impractical for law enforcement to review all of the information
during execution of the warrant at the search location.”).
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As a result, police officers use a different process to search
through digital devices. Instead of conducting the search on location, officers make a copy of all the digital devices listed in the
warrant and then search through the copies at the station.38 This
process is called a two-stage search and is unique to searches of
digital devices.39 At the station, officers will use different forensic
search tools to find evidence that is responsive to the warrant.40
For example, an officer may run all the files through an algorithm
that sees if any of them match a database of innocuous and incriminating files.41 An officer may then use keyword searches to
find text files that relate to the subject of the warrant.42 Or the
officer might restore the suspect’s internet history during the relevant investigatory period. 43 The Fourth Amendment does not
significantly limit how long an officer can search through a copy
of a digital device at the police station.44 As a result, two-stage
searches give officers a prolonged period of time to find incriminating needles in haystacks of data.
3. The plain view doctrine, when applied to digital
searches, is no longer a narrow exception to the warrant
requirement.
The plain view doctrine further expands the scope of digital
searches by allowing officers to seize whatever they find on a computer. As discussed previously, to invoke the plain view doctrine,
officers must satisfy three conditions. They must: (1) see the evidence from a place where they are legally allowed to be; (2) be
able to access the evidence legally; and (3) immediately realize
that the evidence is incriminating.45 Unfortunately, in the digital

38 See Jarrett, et al, Searching and Seizing Computers at *86 (cited in note 16); Kerr,
48 Tex Tech L Rev at 6–7 (cited in note 8).
39 See FRCrP 41(e)(2)(B).
40 See Jarrett, et al, Searching and Seizing Computers at *86 (cited in note 16); Kerr,
48 Tex Tech L Rev at 6–7 (cited in note 8).
41 See Kerr, 119 Harv L Rev at 546 (cited in note 9).
42 Id at 545–46.
43 Id at 542.
44 Because computers can store immense amounts of information, courts have been
reluctant to limit how long an officer can spend searching for incriminating evidence on a
digital device. See, for example, United States v Mutschelknaus, 564 F Supp 2d 1072, 1077
(D ND 2008) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require that the forensic
analysis of computers and other electronic equipment take place within a specific time
limit.”); United States v Burns, 2008 WL 4542990, *8 (ND Ill) (“A delay must be reasonable, but there is no constitutional upper limit on reasonableness.”).
45 See Horton, 496 US at 136–37.
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search context, these three conditions fail to meaningfully restrict
the circumstances in which an officer can invoke the doctrine.
Generally speaking, an officer is allowed to search for and
seize only what is described in a warrant. 46 But in digital
searches, an officer with a warrant can legally open every single
file and examine every piece of data on a computer.47 This means
that the officer always satisfies the first two prongs of the plain
view doctrine: the officer is always in a place where he or she is
legally allowed to be and is able to access the evidence legally.
The result is that if an officer sees information that is clearly incriminating, he or she also satisfies the third prong and the plain
view doctrine applies—regardless of how unrelated the information may be to the original investigation.
For example, if an officer with a warrant to search a computer
for evidence of tax fraud searches for and finds child pornography,
the officer is legally allowed to seize that evidence under the plain
view doctrine. It does not matter that the child pornography is
completely unrelated to tax fraud, or that evidence of tax fraud is
likely to be found in documents whereas the evidence the officer
found was photographic.48 Because the officer had a warrant to
search the computer and because digital evidence can be easily
hidden, the officer was able to look at every file on the computer
to find the evidence described in the warrant.49
C. Analyzing the Constitutionality of Digital Searches
For physical searches, the Fourth Amendment’s Particularity
Clause typically limits the scope of a search.50 But with respect to
digital searches, these doctrines place few restrictions on an officer’s ability to look through everything on a computer. Moreover, because police search procedures have evolved, officers have
the time to take advantage of this broad access. Police can spend
weeks looking at a digital device for something incriminating.

46 See Marron v United States, 275 US 192, 196 (1927) (“The requirement that
warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under
them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing
another.”).
47 See Part I.B.1.
48 See Horton, 496 US at 135–36.
49 See notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
50 See Ross, 456 US at 824 (explaining that the permissible scope of a search is defined by the “object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe
that [the object] may be found”).
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And, if the officer finds this evidence, he or she can seize it under
the plain view doctrine.
This type of generalized search creates a dilemma for courts.
The Fourth Amendment was adopted because the Framers believed that general warrants posed a serious threat to our liberty.51 Officers are not supposed to engage in “a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.”52 Such a search violates the rights
to privacy and property protected by the Constitution.53 But in the
digital context, the Particularity Clause and the plain view doctrine appear to allow officers to do just that—officers can search
through everything on a digital device until they find something
incriminating. As the Second Circuit cautioned:
Once the government has obtained [a warrant] to search [a]
hard drive, the government may claim that the contents of
every file it chose to open were in plain view and, therefore,
admissible even if they implicate the defendant in a crime not
contemplated by the warrant. There is, thus, a serious risk
that every warrant for electronic information will become, in
effect, a general warrant.54
Because existing legal doctrines that have limited the scope
of physical searches have to do the same for digital searches,
courts have had to return to first principles to analyze the constitutionality of digital searches. Under the Fourth Amendment, all
searches are required to be reasonable.55 As discussed previously,
a search is unreasonable if it consists of exploratory rummaging.
In other words, a search must be narrowly tailored to find only
the evidence specified in the warrant.56 Courts have applied this
principle to digital searches and have found that it requires that
“the forensic steps of the [officer’s] search process [be] reasonably
directed at uncovering the evidence specified in the search warrant.” 57 In other words, a digital search violates the Fourth

51

See Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2213.
Horton, 496 US at 136, quoting Coolidge, 403 US at 466 (Stewart) (plurality).
53 See Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2213.
54 Galpin, 720 F3d at 447 (quotation marks omitted).
55 US Const Amend IV. See also King, 563 US at 459 (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”) (quotation marks omitted).
56 See Coolidge, 403 US at 467 (Stewart) (plurality) (stating that the Fourth Amendment requires searches to be as “limited as possible” and not include “general, exploratory
rummaging”).
57 United States v Loera, 923 F3d 907, 917 (10th Cir 2019).
52
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Amendment when it is not conducted in a way that tries to minimize the amount of nonresponsive information viewed by officers.58 That said, this constitutional principle is relatively vague.
It does not clearly tell an officer what he or she can and cannot do
when conducting a digital search. Courts have attempted to fashion new rules that limit the scope of digital searches, but as the
next Part will show, direct judicial regulation of digital searches
can only go so far.
II. TWO WAYS COURTS CAN APPROACH DIGITAL SEARCHES:
FIRST- AND SECOND-ORDER REGULATIONS
To prevent officers from engaging in unconstitutional behavior, courts typically craft rules that directly dictate how officers
should behave. This process is called first-order regulation. But
courts sometimes issue decisions that try to spur the enactment
of new laws that govern officer behavior.59 This second approach
has been called second-order regulation. While first-order regulation is by far the most common type of rule in Fourth Amendment
contexts, the Supreme Court has sometimes engaged in secondorder regulation of searches.60 This Part explains the differences
between these two regulatory approaches. Part II.A provides examples of when courts have adopted the two different approaches
to influence law enforcement behavior. Part II.B then further explores second-order regulation by discussing the types of rules
courts can adopt to incentivize parties to act.
A. First- and Second-Order Regulations
In most Fourth Amendment cases, judges issue decisions that
directly regulate law enforcement officials.61 Courts create rules

58 See Galpin, 720 F3d at 451 (stating that a court assessing the reasonableness of a
digital search should consider “the degree, if any, to which digital search protocols target
information outside the scope of the valid portion of the warrant”); United States v
Townsend, 649 F Appx 189, 191 (3d Cir 2016) (interpreting the Fourth Amendment as
requiring the use of a search protocol that was “reasonably calculated to uncover suspect
files while minimizing the likelihood of opening personal files unrelated to the investigation”); Loera, 923 F3d at 917 (stating that “[o]ur electronic search precedents demonstrate
a shift . . . toward considering whether the forensic steps of the search process were reasonably directed at uncovering the evidence specified in the search warrant”). See also
United States v Rarick, 636 F Appx 911, 916 (6th Cir 2016); Mann, 592 F3d at 786; United
States v Johnston, 789 F3d 934, 942 (9th Cir 2015).
59 See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 209–10 (cited in note 5).
60 See id.
61 See id at 215.

2020]

Penalty Default Rules for Digital Searches

1409

that officers must follow when searching or seizing property. If
officers do not comply with judge-made rules for searching and
seizing property, a court may later conclude that evidence the officers collect is inadmissible.62 The body of judge-made rules that
directly govern officer conduct is complex and detailed. For example, consider the litany of restrictions that the Supreme Court has
placed on an officer’s ability to stop and search a car. To illustrate:
After stopping a car, an officer can search through the car if the
officer has probable cause to believe evidence of a crime is inside.63
The scope of the search will depend on whether the officer has
probable cause to believe that just the trunk or the entire car contains evidence of a crime.64 Alternatively, if the officer arrests the
driver, the officer can search the passenger compartment if it is
“reasonable to believe” it contains evidence of the crime of arrest.65 Some of the rules governing automobile stops are clearer
than others, but all the rules tell officers what to do when they
face certain sets of facts. In other words, the defining characteristic of a first-order regulation is that it speaks directly to officers
in the field.66
In lieu of directly speaking to police officers, courts will occasionally issue decisions that aim to stimulate nonjudicial policymaking.67 Scholars like Professor John Rappaport have called this
mechanism “second-order regulation.” 68 Courts employing
second-order regulation do not want to determine the rules that
govern officer behavior; instead, these courts want to encourage
the legislative or executive branches to adopt rules that are consistent with constitutional principles.69
Generally, courts choose to engage in second-order regulation
instead of first-order regulation when judges believe that it is best
to leave the regulatory decisions to the legislature. This often occurs when courts are considering a problem that is rapidly

62 This doctrine is known as the “exclusionary rule.” See Utah v Strieff, 136 S Ct
2056, 2061 (2016) (defining the rule as “often requir[ing] trial courts to exclude unlawfully
seized evidence in a criminal trial”).
63 See California v Acevedo, 500 US 565, 579–80 (1991).
64 See id.
65 See Arizona v Gant, 556 US 332, 351 (2009).
66 See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 215 (cited in note 5).
67 See id at 218. See also Mikkilineni, Note, 82 NYU L Rev at 1404–05 (cited
in note 11) (analyzing the extent to which the Court is able to incentivize legislative
regulation).
68 Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 214–15 (cited in note 5).
69 See id.

1410

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1395

evolving or is already the subject of pending legislation.70 It can
also occur when judges think they lack the expertise necessary to
effectively craft rules on a subject.71
A good illustration of second-order regulation is the Supreme
Court’s treatment of inventory searches.72 An inventory search is
a search that occurs after an officer has impounded a car.73 During such a search, the officer will catalog everything in the vehicle, making note of anything valuable, illegal, or dangerous that
is discovered. In South Dakota v Opperman,74 the Supreme Court
held that inventory searches are constitutional if they are conducted “pursuant to standard police procedures.”75 But the Court
did not dictate what those procedures must be. Instead, the Court
required police departments to have some standard procedure
that was not based on individualized suspicion.76 Until police departments formulated such a policy, they could not constitutionally conduct inventory searches. By banning inventory searches
until police departments adopted their own standard policies, the
Court encouraged law enforcement departments to self-regulate.77
B. Default Rules as a Type of Second-Order Regulation
When courts engage in second-order regulation, they often
create default rules that regulate officer behavior until nonjudicial policymakers adopt an alternative policy. These default rules
can take two forms. First, they can be placeholder default rules
that are feasible in the interim but which courts hope will be supplanted by a legislatively enacted alternative.78 Or, second, courts
can enact a rule that makes a party worse off by default so that
the party is motivated to act.79 This second type is called a penalty
default rule. When courts adopt either type of default rule—
70

See id at 263–64.
See id at 263.
72 See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 221 (cited in note 5).
73 See Colorado v Bertine, 479 US 367, 368–69 (1987).
74 428 US 364 (1976).
75 Id at 372.
76 See id at 375–76.
77 See Bertine, 479 US at 374 (“[R]easonable police regulations relating to inventory
procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even though courts
might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a
different procedure.”).
78 See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 218–19 (cited in note 5); Mikkilineni, Note, 82
NYU L Rev at 1407–08 (cited in note 11); John Ferejohn and Barry Friedman, Toward a
Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 Fla St U L Rev 825, 850–52 (2006).
79 See Mikkilineni, Note, 82 NYU L Rev at 1409–10 (cited in note 11).
71
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placeholder or penalty—they do so to enable legislatures to replace the default rules with alternative policies.
1. Placeholder default rules.
A placeholder default rule is a rule that police departments
have to follow until nonjudicial policymakers adopt a constitutional alternative.80 An example of this approach is the Supreme
Court’s treatment of post-indictment lineups. In a postindictment lineup, police ask a witness to identify the perpetrator
of a crime from a group of people. In United States v Wade,81 the
Supreme Court held that postindictment lineups were unconstitutional if the suspect did not have a lawyer present to ensure the
lineup was conducted fairly.82 While this holding created a rule
for officers to follow, the Court stated that the rule was replaceable: “[O]ther regulations, such as those of local police departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to meaningful
confrontation at trial may [ ] remove the basis” for requiring counsel to be present.83 In other words, the attorney requirement was
an interim rule that police departments could replace with another rule that minimizes bias in lineups. To make its point crystal clear, the Court included several alternative policies suggested by commentators or followed by other nations that police
departments could adopt in the footnotes of its opinion.84 By leaving the door open to other rules, the Court gave police departments the option to replace its articulated rule with alternatives. 85 This facilitation of divergence is what distinguishes
default rules from direct regulation: police are encouraged to replace default rules, while they are supposed to perpetually follow
direct regulations.
2. Penalty default rules.
Penalty default rules make a party worse off by default to
motivate the party to act.86 Originally conceptualized by Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, penalty default rules were
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

See Ferejohn and Friedman, 33 Fla St U L Rev at 850–52 (cited in note 78).
388 US 218 (1967).
See id at 237.
Id at 239.
See id at 236–37 nn 26, 29, 30.
See Ferejohn and Friedman, 33 Fla St U L Rev at 851 (cited in note 78).
See Mikkilineni, Note, 82 NYU L Rev at 1409 (cited in note 11).
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first described in contracts.87 But in recent years, commentators
have argued that penalty default rules can be found in constitutional law as well. 88 For example, in Barker v Wingo, 89 the
Supreme Court held that if a defendant is not given a speedy trial,
the Sixth Amendment is violated.90 But rather than remedy the
constitutional violation through direct regulation, the Court
adopted a default rule that was particularly undesirable for the
government: the indictment must be dismissed if a defendant is
not given a speedy trial.91 Concerned that defendants who would
otherwise be convicted would go free under Barker, Congress
acted by passing the federal Speedy Trial Act.92 In other words,
the Court motivated the legislature to regulate criminal procedure by adopting a penalty default rule.93
In summary, second-order regulations are judicial decisions
that incentivize nonjudicial policymakers to regulate police conduct. They might prohibit a police tactic entirely as a penalty default or provide for a placeholder rule. But whatever tactic a court
employs, the underlying purpose of a second-order regulation is
to encourage the other branches to regulate officer behavior. The
remainder of this Comment will show not only that courts are already using second-order regulation, but also that second-order
regulation is a more promising tool to combat intrusive digital
searches than first-order regulation.
III. THE JUDICIAL EMBRACE OF SECOND-ORDER REGULATION
As discussed in Part I, digital searches pose unique Fourth
Amendment challenges: police search procedures have evolved to
enable officers to sift through vast amounts of data, while traditional legal doctrines do little to narrow the expanding scope of
digital searches. This Part shows that courts have already embraced second-order regulations to address this problem.

87 See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87, 91 (1989). But see generally Eric A. Posner,
There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 Fla St U L Rev 563 (2005).
88 See, for example Ferejohn and Friedman, 33 Fla St U L Rev at 846–47 (cited in
note 78); William J. Stuntz, Of Seatbelts and Sentences, Supreme Court Justices and
Spending Patterns—Understanding the Unraveling of American Criminal Justice, 119
Harv L Rev F 148, 155 (2006).
89 407 US 514 (1972).
90 See id at 522.
91 See id.
92 Pub L No 93-619, 88 Stat 2076 (1975), codified at 18 USC §§ 3152–56, 3161–74.
93 See also Mikkilineni, Note, 82 NYU L Rev at 1411–12 (cited in note 11).
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Part III.A describes how courts have conveyed that they are ill
equipped to dictate how police officers should conduct searches in
a rapidly evolving technological environment. As a result, courts
have not been willing to directly regulate digital searches. Instead, courts have increasingly asked the legislative or executive
branches to step in and craft rules for officers to follow when
searching digital devices. To that end, Part III.B argues that
courts have opted for second-order regulation and adopted a set
of default rules. These rules aim to regulate digital searches
while still giving legislators the ability to supplant the rules with
alternatives.
A. Courts Want Legislatures to Regulate Digital Searches
To ensure that police conduct complies with constitutional
principles, courts often directly regulate officer behavior. 94 But
when opportunities arise to directly regulate the way officers conduct digital searches, courts have explicitly refused to do so. For
example, federal courts have consistently rejected arguments
that warrants to search digital devices must include search protocols.95 Instead, some circuits have asked legislatures to step in
and restrict the scope of digital searches.
Search protocols are procedures that officers must follow
when conducting a search.96 A search protocol may limit how long
data can be stored or dictate the steps an officer must follow when
conducting a search.97 In theory, search protocols limit the scope

94

See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 215 (cited in note 5).
See, for example, United States v Richards, 659 F3d 527, 539 (6th Cir 2011)
(“[G]iven the unique problem encountered in computer searches, and the practical difficulties inherent in implementing [ ] search methodologies, the majority of federal courts
have eschewed the use of a specific search protocol.”). See also, for example, United States
v Cartier, 543 F3d 442, 447–48 (8th Cir 2008) (finding that a warrant to search a computer
did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause despite lacking a “specific search
strategy”); United States v Stabile, 633 F3d 219, 240 (3d Cir 2011) (same); Mann, 592 F3d
at 785 (same); United States v Russian, 848 F3d 1239, 1245 n 1 (10th Cir 2017) (same);
United States v Khanani, 502 F3d 1281, 1290–91 (11th Cir 2007) (same); Richards, 659
F3d at 538 n 9 (collecting cases). While state courts also apply Fourth Amendment principles to police conduct, this Comment focuses on the approach taken by federal courts.
96 See Kerr, 96 Va L Rev at 1248–49 (cited in note 7). See also In re the Search of
Premises Known as: Three Hotmail Email Accounts, 2016 WL 1239916, *2 (D Kan) (defining a search protocol as “a document submitted by the government explaining to the Court
how it will conduct its search”); In re the Search of Apple iPhone, IMEI 013888003738427,
31 F Supp 3d 159, 166 (DDC 2014) (stating that a search protocol is “an explanation of the
[ ] methodology the government will use to separate what is permitted to be seized from
what is not”).
97 See Kerr, 96 Va L Rev at 1249 (cited in note 7).
95
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of a search in the same way that the Particularity Clause does—
by making officers declare ex ante what they are looking for and
how they will find it.98 For a brief period, commentators thought
that including search protocols in warrants would become the
norm. In United States v Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc,99 the
Ninth Circuit briefly mandated that every warrant application to
search a digital device contain search protocols.100 However, few
circuits elected to follow its approach.101 Even the Ninth Circuit
ultimately backtracked: the circuit reversed its stance within a
year, revising the opinion and relegating the controversial approach to nonbinding guidance.102
Many courts refused to require search protocols because they
were concerned that direct regulation would be ineffective. 103
Courts were concerned that they would get the protocols wrong
and thereby unduly hamper the effectiveness of law enforcement.104 To be effective, a search protocol must be narrowly tailored so that it limits the scope of a search. But if the protocol is
too restrictive, it can prevent an officer from finding relevant evidence hidden on a device.105 Striking the right balance is difficult
in part because, as discussed previously, digital evidence can be
easily disguised. 106 To make matters worse, many magistrate
98 See, for example, Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 Harv J L & Tech 75, 85–89 (1994). The legal hook for this argument is that
warrants to search digital devices are overbroad because they allow officers to search
through lots of innocuous materials. See id at 86. One way to limit the scope of a search is
by including search protocols that limit the way an officer can conduct the search.
99 579 F3d 989 (9th Cir 2009) (en banc) (CDT II).
100 See id at 1006–07.
101 Both the Third and Seventh Circuits explicitly rejected the approach, finding it illadvised. Stabile, 633 F3d at 241 n 16; Mann, 592 F3d at 785. Other circuits similarly arrived at this conclusion, albeit less explicitly. See, for example, Richards, 659 F3d at 539;
Cartier, 543 F3d at 447; Russian, 848 F3d at 1245 n 1; Khanani, 502 F3d at 1290.
102 See generally United States v Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc, 621 F3d 1162 (9th
Cir 2010) (en banc) (CDT III). The requirement to use specific search protocols shifted
from the lead opinion to a concurrence. See id at 1178 (Kozinski concurring). While the
Ninth Circuit provided no official explanation for its change, the radical nature of CDT
II’s guidance and its poor reception by other circuits immediately following the opinion
may have contributed to the circuit’s decision. See also Untied States v Schesso, 730 F3d
1040, 1049 (9th Cir 2013) (holding that the guidance from CDT III was only advisory and
that warrants to search digital devices were still valid without search protocols).
103 See, for example, United States v Burgess, 576 F3d 1078, 1094 (10th Cir 2009)
(“[I]t is folly for a search warrant to attempt to structure the mechanics of the search and
a warrant imposing such limits would unduly restrict legitimate search objectives.”).
104 See, for example, id at 1092. See also Mann, 592 F3d at 785; Richards, 659 F3d at
538, quoting Stabile, 633 F3d at 237.
105 See Kerr, 96 Va L Rev at 1249 (cited in note 7).
106 See Part I.B. See also Burgess, 576 F3d at 1092–93.
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judges are less familiar with forensic search tools than police officers are.107 This lack of familiarity makes it difficult for a judge
to know whether the search tool gives the officer access to a
breadth of information that may or may not be responsive to the
warrant. For example, in United States v Schlingloff,108 a district
judge granted a motion to reconsider after learning more about
how a digital search tool functioned.109 The judge previously believed that an officer had no ability to view the images identified
by a search tool; however, upon discovering that the officer could
view the images when he enabled a certain feature, the judge had
no choice but to conclude that the officer’s search had exceeded
the scope of the warrant.110 Moreover, when a magistrate judge
considers a warrant application, only the government briefs the
judge. This lack of an adversarial briefing increases the likelihood
that a judge—unfamiliar with the details of digital searches—will
fail to accurately assess the privacy interests at stake.111 Due to
these challenges, circuit courts have consistently rejected proposals to require warrants to include search protocols. This resounding rejection of ex ante search protocols indicates courts’
discomfort with direct regulation.
Courts are also hesitant to directly regulate because of the
pace at which technology is evolving.112 Courts are keenly aware
that any decision they make today will bind future courts.
Changes in technologies might render any decision about digital
searches inapposite in the future. For example, in one case about
a digital search, the Third Circuit briefly wondered how its decision might affect the outcome of future cases that involved
107
108
109

See Kerr, 119 Harv L Rev at 575–76 (cited in note 9).
901 F Supp 2d 1101 (CD Ill 2012).
Id at 1103:

The Court initially denied the Motion to Suppress based in part on the mistaken
belief that the filters in the FTK system had to be applied on an all or nothing
basis and that the agent lacked the ability to disable the portion of the KFF
specifically alerting to known child pornography or other contraband.
110

See id at 1103–06.
See Russian, 848 F3d at 1245 n 1 (“[W]e note that, like other circuits, we have
previously declined to require a search protocol for computer searches, since courts are
better able to assess the reasonableness of search protocols . . . ‘where evidence and experts from both sides can be entertained and examined.’”). See also Kerr, 96 Va L Rev at
1283 (cited in note 7).
112 See United States v Perez, 712 F Appx 136, 140 (3d Cir 2017) (expressing concern
that emerging and evolving technologies would render its decisions about the scope of digital searches inapposite); United States v Ganias, 824 F3d 199, 219–20 (2d Cir 2016)
(invoking the legislative history of the Wiretap Act to argue that legislators should play a
role in regulating digital searches given the pace of technological change).
111
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algorithmic searches.113 The court noted that police departments
are increasingly using search tools (like the one officers used in
the case) in which a computer performs the initial search so no
human sees the evidence.114 Similarly, in CDT II, the Ninth Circuit pondered the implications that cloud computing would have
on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.115 For example, the court
highlighted that a warrant to search “Google’s [ ] servers to look
for a few incriminating messages could jeopardize the privacy of
millions.”116 Crafting rules that effectively apply to a range of rapidly changing technologies is like trying to hit a moving target: it
requires a court to assess how technology interacts with precedent today while also predicting how technology will evolve in the
future.
Given the challenges of regulating changing technologies,
some federal courts have suggested that legislatures should play
a more prominent role in limiting the scope of digital searches.117
For example, in United States v Ganias,118 the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, discussed the difficulties of regulating searches of
digital devices and asked for legislative intervention: “[W]e seek
[ ] to suggest that search and seizure of electronic media may . . .
merit . . . legislative analysis; courts need not act alone.”119 The
Third Circuit has also expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of
legislative involvement in addressing these issues. It urged Congress or the executive branch to step in to enact statutes that better address the problem of the “proverbial digital haystack.”120
While judges may be able to weigh the privacy and law enforcement interests at a high level, many federal courts have concluded that they should not craft detailed rules telling officers
how to conduct a digital search. Courts acknowledge that digital
searches threaten suspects’ privacy interests. But they simply do
not want to be in the business of telling officers what steps to follow when conducting a search. As a result, many circuits have
refused to take advantage of opportunities to directly regulate

113

Perez, 712 F Appx at 140.
See id.
115 See CDT II, 579 F3d at 1002.
116 Id.
117 Ganias, 824 F3d at 219 (“Statutory approaches . . . have, historically, provided one
mechanism for safeguarding privacy interests while, at the same time, addressing the
needs of law enforcement in the face of technological change.”).
118 824 F3d 199 (2d Cir 2016) (en banc).
119 Id at 220.
120 Perez, 712 F Appx at 140.
114
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digital searches, preferring instead that the legislative and executive branches step in.
B. Courts Have Adopted Default Rules to Encourage
Legislative Action
As the prior Section explained, some circuits believe that legislators, rather than judges, are best positioned to regulate digital
searches—and that is why courts engage in second-order regulation. But to actually engage in second-order regulation, courts
must issue decisions that legislatures can effectively supplant.
This Section claims that courts have done just that for digital
searches. To ensure that police officers conduct constitutional digital searches—by narrowly tailoring their searches to find only
the evidence described in the warrant—courts have adopted various placeholder default rules. Courts have stated that digital
searches are likely reasonable if the officer: (1) conducts a pyramidal search, (2) looks at nonresponsive material very briefly, and
(3) gets a second warrant after finding incriminating evidence
outside the scope of the original warrant.
1. Pyramidal search process for searching a digital device.
The Second, 121 Third, 122 Sixth, 123 Seventh, 124 Ninth, 125 and
Tenth Circuits126 have found that a search is often reasonable if
officers follow a high-level procedure when they search through
digital devices. The Tenth Circuit developed this approach. The
121 See United States v Galpin, 720 F3d 436, 451 (2d Cir 2013) (instructing reviewing
courts to consider whether an officer’s search methodology targeted folders and files outside the scope of the warrant).
122 See Stabile, 633 F3d at 239–40 (favorably discussing an officer search that began
by indexing all the files on the computer, searching the indexed files, and only opening the
files that were responsive to the search tools used).
123 See Richards, 659 F3d at 540 (finding that it is reasonable for an officer to use
search tools to sort all the files on a computer and then examine the ones that appear to
be the target of the warrant).
124 See Mann, 592 F3d at 784–85 (concluding that an officer’s use of a search program
to sort the files on a computer was appropriate, but that the officer exceeded the scope of
the warrant when he opened files that the program deemed were not responsive to the
warrant).
125 See United States v Johnston, 789 F3d 934, 942 (9th Cir 2015) (holding that an
officer’s search was not unreasonable when he first conducted a forensic preview to preserve the data on a computer, then conducted a “bare minimum forensic scan” and used
software to sort the files for those related to the warrant) (quotation marks omitted).
126 See United States v Loera, 923 F3d 907, 919 (10th Cir 2019) (finding that a search
using a digital image preview program was reasonable because it was the best way to
search for images).
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Tenth Circuit wants “an officer executing a search warrant to first
look in the most obvious places and as it becomes necessary to
progressively move from the obvious to the obscure.”127 Said differently, officers should start by using search tools to find files
that clearly respond to the warrant and then broaden the search
if the initial inquiries fail to discover evidence—following a process that resembles a pyramid. 128 By using a pyramidal search
method, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that officers “avoid[ ] conducting the kind of ‘sweeping, comprehensive search of a computer’s hard drive’ that [is] prohibited.”129
Other circuits have embraced the Tenth Circuit’s broad
framework. They have similarly found that an officer reasonably
targets his search by looking first at the files that most likely respond to the warrant.130 In United States v Stabile,131 for example,
the Third Circuit applied this pyramidal framework to find that
the steps an officer followed when looking for evidence of tax
fraud were reasonable:
[The officer] began by physically inspecting the hard drive
and creating a copy of the drive to ensure that the original
drive was not damaged or corrupted during the search. Next,
[the officer] examined the file signatures to see if any files
had been corrupted. He then conducted a ‘hash value analysis’ to see if any files had been copied. Finally, he examined
suspicious and out-of-place folders. . . . These procedures
demonstrate that [the officer] engaged in a focused search of
the hard drives rather than a general search.132
2. Time spent looking at nonresponsive files.
Courts have also created a default rule governing how long
officers can examine information that is unrelated to the purpose
of the warrant. When an officer spends too much time looking for
unrelated evidence, courts have concluded that the search was
127

Burgess, 576 F3d at 1094.
Officers should start by first analyzing “the file structure, next looking for suspicious file folders, then looking for files and types of files most likely to contain the objects
of the search by doing keyword searches.” Id. “For instance, unless specifically authorized
by the warrant there would be little reason for officers searching for evidence of drug trafficking to look at tax returns (beyond verifying [that] the folder labeled ‘2002 Tax Return’
actually contains tax returns and not drug files or trophy pictures).” Id.
129 Loera, 923 F3d at 918.
130 See notes 121–25.
131 633 F3d 219 (3d Cir 2011).
132 Id at 239–40.
128
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unreasonable.133 To illustrate, compare two cases from the Tenth
Circuit: United States v Carey134 and United States v Burgess.135
In Carey, an officer found a folder of child pornography while
searching for evidence of drug trafficking on a computer.136 After
finding the folder, the officer spent five hours opening every image to confirm that it was child pornography.137 The Tenth Circuit
found that this was unlawful because it was clear by the length
of time that the officer had “abandoned” his search for the evidence listed in the warrant and instead had embarked on a search
for evidence of child pornography. 138 By contrast, in Burgess,
when an officer stumbled upon an image of child pornography,
the officer immediately closed the file and sought a second warrant.139 The court distinguished this case from Carey in part by
highlighting the difference in time spent looking at the nonresponsive material: less than one minute was acceptable, but five
hours was not. 140 The Second, 141 Third, 142 and Sixth Circuits 143
have embraced a view similar to the Tenth Circuit’s. These courts
have concluded that a digital search may be unreasonable if the

133 See, for example, Loera, 923 F3d at 919. This rule stems from the case law regulating searches of filing cabinets. In Andresen v Maryland, 427 US 463 (1976), the
Supreme Court held that when an officer searches a filing cabinet, the officer can look at
every document in a cursory manner to see if it is responsive to the warrant. Id at 482
n 11. Arguably, filing cabinets pose many of the same challenges that computers pose.
Filing cabinets and computers both contain lots of files, some of which are incriminating
and others innocuous. It is difficult to know without looking at all the files which ones are
incriminating: the labels cannot be trusted as that would easily evade law enforcement.
Due to these similarities, courts have applied this precedent to digital searches and extrapolated that looking at nonresponsive evidence for a prolonged period of time can make
a search unreasonable.
134 172 F3d 1268 (10th Cir 1999).
135 576 F3d 1078 (10th Cir 2009).
136 Carey, 172 F3d at 1270–71.
137 Id at 1273.
138 Id.
139 Burgess, 576 F3d at 1094–95.
140 See id.
141 See United States v Ulbricht, 858 F3d 71, 101–03 (2d Cir 2017) (finding that it was
reasonable for an officer to “cursorily” inspect the files that were responsive to the search
terms to see if they responded to the warrant).
142 See United States v Highbarger, 380 F Appx 127, 131 n 5 (3rd Cir 2010) (contrasting an officer’s behavior with that of the officer in Carey: the officer in this case immediately closed the file after realizing that it was not responsive to the warrant instead
of continuing to look at it for hours).
143 See United States v Rarick, 636 F Appx 911, 916 (6th Cir 2016) (concluding that
an officer’s search was reasonable in part because he immediately stopped looking at the
nonresponsive evidence after realizing that it was outside the scope of the warrant).
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officer conducts more than a cursory examination of data unrelated to the warrant.
3. Second warrant requirement.
Finally, courts in the Third,144 Fourth,145 Sixth,146 and Seventh
Circuits147 have considered a default rule requiring officers to obtain a second warrant once they find incriminating evidence unrelated to the original warrant.148 If the officer fails to get a second
warrant, the officer cannot expand the scope of the search to encompass the new evidence. 149 For example, in United States v
Rarick,150 an officer had a warrant to look for a particular video
on a cell phone.151 Pursuant to the warrant, the officer scrolled
through the thumbnails of photos on the phone.152 As he did so, he
thought he saw photos that looked like child pornography but did
not open those photos to confirm his suspicions.153 He eventually
came across “an image of a beige wall that he thought could be
the start of the video.”154 At this point, he opened the video file
and soon discovered that it was child pornography.155 He immediately turned off the video, closed the phone, and obtained a second
warrant before proceeding with the search.156 Because the officer
stopped to get a second warrant after discovering unrelated evidence, the court found that the officer did not violate the Fourth
Amendment when he found the evidence of child pornography.157
This rule—the second warrant requirement—often goes hand in
144 See Highbarger, 380 F Appx at 131 (finding that evidence outside the scope of a
warrant was admissible because the officer stopped searching after discovering it and acquired a second warrant).
145 See United States v Nasher-Alneam, 399 F Supp 3d 579, 594 (SD W Va 2019) (declining to admit evidence because the government failed to obtain a second search warrant).
146 See United States v Lucas, 640 F3d 168, 178–80 (6th Cir 2011) (same).
147 See Mann, 592 F3d at 780, 786 (stating that it was “troubled” by the officer’s failure to obtain a second warrant, but upholding the search on other grounds).
148 See, for example, Lucas, 640 F3d at 179–80; Mann, 592 F3d at 786; NasherAlneam, 399 F Supp 3d at 594–95. But see Loera, 923 F3d at 921 (stating that officers who
come across “evidence of incriminating, nonresponsive material” do not need to get a second warrant to continue searching pursuant to the first warrant, but instead must navigate away from the nonresponsive material).
149 See, for example, Lucas, 640 F3d at 178–80.
150 646 F Appx 911 (6th Cir 2016).
151 Id at 916.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Rarick, 636 F Appx at 916.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
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hand with the rule limiting the amount of time spent looking at
nonresponsive files. If an officer finds evidence that is outside of
the scope of the warrant, he or she should stop looking at it, and,
if the officer wants to then use that evidence, the discovery should
be legitimized by getting a second warrant.
***
Together, these three rules demonstrate what search practices tend to be reasonable. Some circuits (like the Tenth Circuit)
have adopted all three of these rules. 158 Other circuits have
adopted just one or two. But consistent across all of these circuits
is the finding that compliance with one or all of these rules does
not necessarily mean that a search is constitutional.159 The Tenth
Circuit, for example, has called these rules “instructive,” and has
emphasized that compliance with them is not dispositive. 160 In
other words, these rules are just indicia of reasonableness; there
may be other rules that officers must follow when conducting a
digital search in order for a search to be reasonable. Because
these rules are not the sum total of how to judge whether a digital
search is reasonable, they are just placeholder default rules that
the legislatures can supplement. In fact, as demonstrated in
Part III.A, some circuits have even expressly asked legislators to
step in and enact policies that narrow the scope of digital
searches.
IV. HOW COURTS SHOULD ENCOURAGE NONJUDICIAL
REGULATION OF DIGITAL SEARCHES
To induce legislators to regulate digital searches, courts have
crafted a set of default rules that policymakers can replace with
alternatives. This Part argues that the specific rules that court
have adopted in the context of the Fourth Amendment have undercut their calls for legislative involvement. As Part IV.A explains, courts historically have succeeded in catalyzing nonjudicial policymaking when they adopted penalty default rules that
disfavored the police. When courts disrupted favorable status quo
158

See, for example, Loera, 923 F3d at 919–20; Burgess, 576 F3d at 1095.
See, for example, Stabile, 633 F3d at 241 (stating that the application of the reasonableness standard in the context of digital searches will “vary from case to case in a
common-sense, fact-intensive manner”); Richards, 659 F3d at 538 (emphasizing that the
application of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement will vary on a “caseby-case basis”).
160 Loera, 923 F3d at 917.
159
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policing practices, legislatures were spurred into action. But, as
Part IV.B demonstrates, the default rules governing digital
searches are not disruptive—they reflect the status quo. As a result, these rules are failing to incentivize legislative action. As
Part IV.C explains, this outcome is problematic because legislatures are better equipped to regulate rapidly changing technologies than courts are. Given the benefits of legislative action,
Part IV.D provides a way to more effectively engage in secondorder regulation: penalty default rules.
A. Penalty Default Rules Encourage Nonjudicial Policymaking
As discussed in Part II, courts typically regulate officer behavior directly. That said, courts have occasionally tried to encourage legislative or executive branches to regulate officer conduct. These efforts at second-order regulation have not always
been successful. But the most successful instances have something in common: courts more effectively encourage legislative action when they adopt penalty default rules that disadvantage the
police.161
A quintessential example of courts using penalty default
rules to incentivize legislative action is the legislative history of
the Wiretap Act.162 In Berger v New York,163 the Supreme Court
concluded that a state statutory scheme governing wiretaps violated the Fourth Amendment.164 The statutory scheme allowed officers to engage in “a series of intrusions . . . pursuant to a single
showing of probable cause.”165 Thus, “rather than being ‘carefully
circumscribed’ so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of privacy,” the state scheme “actually permit[ted] general searches by
electronic devices.”166 General searches are, of course, unconstitutional. In striking down the statute, the Court made it clear that
any future legislation governing wiretaps would have to provide
strong mechanisms to protect suspects’ privacy.167 Eavesdropping
161 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn L Rev
349, 379 (1974) (“Under the stimulus or apprehension of constitutional decisions by the
courts, legislatures may be moved to act.”); Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 260–61 (cited in
note 5). See also Stuntz, 119 Harv L Rev F at 155 (cited in note 88).
162 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub L No 90-351, 82 Stat
197, codified as amended at 34 USC § 10101 et seq.
163 388 US 41 (1967).
164 See id at 58–60.
165 Id at 59.
166 Id at 58.
167 See Berger, 388 US at 63–64.
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could be sanctioned under the Fourth Amendment if “its use was
‘under the most precise and discriminate circumstances.’” 168 If the
law could not be drawn narrowly, the Court cautioned that it
would find that “the ‘fruits’ of eavesdropping devices [were]
barred under the Amendment.”169 Fearing that law enforcement
agencies would be unable to use wiretaps without legislative action, Congress passed the Wiretap Act. The Act both ensured officers could utilize wiretaps in the future while providing heightened privacy protections for suspects. 170 This win-win outcome
can be traced to the Supreme Court’s threat to impose a default
penalty rule.171 By threatening to adopt a rule that would significantly hamper law enforcement, policymakers were prompted to
legislate.172
Default rules that do not penalize the police, however, have a
much weaker track record of spurring nonjudicial regulation.
Miranda v Arizona173 has the dubious reputation as being both
the most famous example of a placeholder default rule and also a
prime example of what not to do if a court’s goal is to incentivize
legislative activity.174 In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that
officers must inform suspects of their rights and do so by reciting
a disclaimer; otherwise, a suspect’s statements are inadmissible
in court.175 That said, the Court did not intend for the warnings to
be permanently followed by all police departments. In its decision,
the Court stated that Miranda warnings must be given “unless
other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons
of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it.”176 The Court went on to “encourage Congress and the
States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective
ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting
efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.”177 In other words, the
Court saw its holding as creating a placeholder default rule:

168

Id at 63.
Id.
170 See 18 USC § 2518..
171 See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 260–61 (cited in note 5).
172 See Stuntz, 119 Harv L Rev F at 155 (cited in note 88).
173 384 US 436 (1966).
174 See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 260–61 (cited in note 5); Mikkilineni, Note, 82
NYU L Rev at 1422–24 (cited in note 11).
175 Miranda, 384 US at 444–45.
176 Id at 444.
177 Id at 467.
169
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reading suspects their rights was just one of several constitutional alternatives police departments could employ.178
Yet, to this day, no state or locality has fully replaced the
Miranda warnings with an alternative policy.179 One reason for
this failure was the emerging realization that, despite widespread
fears, the warnings had no significant effect on discouraging arrestees from making statements to the police. 180 In fact,
Miranda’s holding was actually quite favorable to the police: the
warnings themselves do not discourage suspects from making incriminating statements, but the warnings do immunize the police
from future Fifth Amendment challenges.181 Because Miranda’s
default rule was one that police departments could tolerate, few
police departments and legislatures expended political capital to
experiment with alternatives.
Miranda is thus an example of how placeholder default rules
can fail to stimulate policymaking. Academics like Professor
Rappaport argue that Miranda is indicative of a larger concern
about placeholder default rules: if courts “implement[ ] a secondorder holding through a default rule, and the default rule is politically palatable and not obviously more costly than its alternatives,” it is unlikely the default rule will lead to legislative
action.182 In other words, politically palatable placeholder rules
can “let politicians off the hook; once the Court weighs in, legislators can move on to other questions.”183 Penalty default rules, in
contrast, are not politically palatable. When they disadvantage
the police, like in Berger, they can incentivize legislative activity.
B. Existing Digital Search Default Rules Will Not Lead to
Legislation
Unfortunately, the placeholder default rules courts have
adopted to narrow the scope of digital searches is subject to the
same pitfalls as the rules in Miranda. Default rules motivate lawmakers to act when they are politically unpalatable among key
178 See Ferejohn and Friedman, 33 Fla St U L Rev at 851–52 (cited in note 78);
Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 224–25 (cited in note 5).
179 See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 225 (cited in note 5).
180 See id at 259; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw U L Rev 500, 504–06 (1996).
181 See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Cal L Rev 673,
744–46 (1992).
182 Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 258 (cited in note 5).
183 Id, quoting David Alan Sklansky, Killer Seatbelts and Criminal Procedure, 119
Harv L Rev F 56, 64 (2006).
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constituencies like police officers. In Miranda, the default rule
was palatable to police. So too are the default rules for digital
searches. These rules reflect existing police practices that are privacy invasive. Because these digital search default rules do not
interfere with the status quo, police departments feel no need to
lobby policymakers to pass laws to change them. Policymakers
thus are not motivated to replace the default rules with
alternatives.
Consider, for example, the general framework that courts
have provided for how officers should conduct searches. As discussed in Part III.B.1, some circuits have found that a search is
often reasonable if the officer conducts a pyramidal search: the
officer should start by using search tools to look through the entire computer for folders and files that are responsive to the warrant, and visually inspect only those files that respond to the
search tools. But this general framework fails to meaningfully
change how officers conduct digital searches. Officers already follow this process. Police manuals instruct officers to first sort the
information on the device, then use software to search for relevant materials, and finally open only the materials that respond
to the search tools.184 In other words, this default rule reflects current police practices. Because the rule reflects the status quo, policymakers have no incentivize to replace the default rule with alternatives. Police are happy with the current rule and so do not
lobby for change.
But this placeholder default rule is not desirable in the long
term. While requiring officers to start their searches in the most
obvious places is an intuitive rule, it does little to limit the scope
of a search. If an officer fails to find evidence in the most obvious
places, the rule allows the officer to expand the scope of the search
to increasingly less obvious, more tangentially related folders. As
a result, the rule does not prevent an officer from looking through
everything on a digital device if the suspect has hidden the
evidence well—or worse, if the suspect has committed no crimes
at all.
The second warrant requirement, like the pyramidal search
rule, is another example of a default rule that will fail to incentive
policymakers to act. It too reflects existing, privacy-invasive police practices. According to this default rule, officers must get a
184 See, for example Jarrett, et al, Searching and Seizing Computers at *86 (cited in
note 16); INTERPOL, Global Guidelines for Digital Forensics Laboratories *42–48 (May
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/4WZB-UU45.
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second warrant after discovering evidence unrelated to the subject of the original warrant.185 But law enforcement agencies already provide similar guidance to officers. For example, the Department of Justice recommends that officers stop searching and
apply for a second warrant if they discover digital evidence substantially outside the scope of the original warrant.186 Because the
second warrant requirement reflects existing police practices, it
is not going to incentivize lawmakers to act. Police officers are
content with the status quo and so will not feel the need to lobby
legislatures for a change.
The second warrant requirement also provides illusory privacy protections. This requirement only applies after an officer
has found incriminating evidence. Because the officer found the
evidence while conducting an otherwise lawful search, the officer
can invoke the plain view doctrine and include the incriminating
evidence in the application for a second warrant. When presented
with a warrant application that includes evidence of the kind the
warrant is for, a magistrate judge will certainly approve it. As a
result, if an officer finds unrelated evidence, the officer will be
able to get a second warrant and the scope of the search will inevitably expand. The second warrant requirement and the rule
requiring officers to look at nonresponsive material briefly, therefore, do not prevent an officer from looking for incriminating evidence outside the scope of the warrant. In fact, they arguably encourage officers to engage in generalized searches because officers
know that if they find incriminating evidence outside the scope of
the warrant, they just need to apply for a second warrant in order
to legitimize its discovery.
Unfortunately, both the pyramidal search rule and the second warrant requirement are two placeholder default rules that
reflect existing privacy-invasive police practices. Because these
rules reflect the status quo, police departments are not going to
lobby legislators to replace the placeholder default rules. Without
that push, it is not likely that legislatures will act. Individuals
may be concerned that their privacy interests could be infringed
by police officers, but for most of us, this concern is small. Because
the citizenry is a diffuse interest group, it is unlikely that this

185

See Part III.B.3.
See Jarrett, et al, Searching and Seizing Computers at *91 (cited in note 16) (“[I]t
remains prudent to seek a second warrant upon discovering evidence of an additional
crime not identified in the initial warrant.”).
186
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small concern about digital searches will be sufficient to mobilize
citizens to lobby policymakers for more privacy-protective rules.
In contrast, law enforcement officials are a discrete and
highly organized interest group. They are better positioned to successfully lobby legislatures to change default rules. As a result,
default rules that disadvantage the police are more likely to spur
legislative action. But unfortunately, the placeholder rules courts
have adopted for digital searches reflect the status quo and will
not incentivize nonjudicial policymaking. Without the enactment
of new laws that narrow the scope of digital searches, suspects
will have to rely on existing Fourth Amendment doctrines—doctrines that provide minimal privacy protections against expansive digital searches.
C. Why the Legislature Should Regulate Digital Searches
For the reasons discussed in the previous Section, it is unlikely that legislatures will replace the existing digital search default rules with alternatives: they’re too politically palatable to
motivate legislators to act. Such an outcome, however, forgoes the
benefits of having legislatures regulate government searches of
digital devices.
A comparison of institutional competencies suggests that the
legislative branch is better equipped to regulate digital searches
than the judiciary. This is in large part due to the pace at which
technology is currently evolving. A central conceit of our judicial
system is that legal doctrines are established over time.187 Courts
craft rules through the process of repeatedly hearing similar
cases. But, as Professor Orin Kerr has argued, this process is undermined when technology is changing so fast that courts cannot
repeatedly hear the same cases. For example, the detailed body of
rules governing car searches evolved over a period of decades.188
Judges were able to craft these detailed rules because the underlying technology (cars) has not changed significantly over time.189
By contrast, a court’s decade-old analysis of a case involving cell
phones may already be outdated. 190 Crafting detailed direct

187 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L Rev
877, 888 (1996).
188 See Part II.A. See also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich L Rev 801, 862–83 (2004).
189 See id at 860–64.
190 See, for example, the facts of Riley v California, 573 US 373, 378–81 (2014).
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regulations requires stability that is not present for digital
technologies.191
Of course, the legislature is not immune from the challenges
posed by rapidly changing technologies: elected officials are also
unable to predict the future. For example, the legislature failed
to foresee the privacy risk that silent video surveillance would
pose when Congress enacted the Wiretap Act.192 That said, the
legislature is better equipped to regulate evolving technologies
because it is able to regulate in an anticipatory fashion. In contrast, courts are required to rule on the facts before them. Due to
the slow pace of litigation, judges are often ruling on the legitimacy of investigatory tactics that occurred several years in the
past. While the delay may not matter for police tools that never
go out of style (such as police interrogations) this delay can be
significant when digital devices are involved. Courts of appeal are
often crafting rules to resolve cases about old technologies. For
example, in Riley v California,193 Chief Justice John Roberts lamented the fact that the focus of one of the consolidated cases before the court was on a flip phone.194 Chief Justice Roberts himself
noted that the flip phone is functionally much more limited than
current technology and is no longer in popular use.195 Moreover,
while judges can anticipate future changes, they are limited in
their ability to issue rules unrelated to the controversy before
them. 196 The legislature, in contrast, does not have these constraints: it is able to launch investigations into future trends and
fashion rules in a proactive manner.
This is not to say that courts are completely unable to devise
flexible rules that are able to anticipate technological changes.
Courts have done so before. In Kyllo v United States,197 for example, the Supreme Court anticipated the evolution of heat-sensing
technology when crafting its holding. 198 But when either
191 Kerr, 102 Mich L Rev at 860–64 (cited in note 188) (arguing that the similar fact
patterns that arise when technologies do not substantially change over time permit courts
to strike the proper balance between law enforcement needs and privacy interests while
providing clear, workable rules).
192 See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 Fordham L Rev 747, 763 (2005).
193 573 US 353 (2014).
194 See id at 380.
195 See id at 385.
196 Kerr, 102 Mich L Rev at 868 (cited in note 188).
197 533 US 27 (2001).
198 See id at 36 (“[T]he rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems
that are already in use or in development.”).
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institution tries to predict the future, errors sometimes occur. Policymakers and judges may be wrong about what the future holds
and craft rules that are poorly suited to emerging technologies. In
the event of such an error, the legislative and executive branches
are better able to change the rules than courts are.199
Stare decisis binds courts’ ability to turn a new leaf when past
approaches do not adequately solve new problems. For example,
in the years leading up to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision
in Riley, many courts found that a police officer could search a
suspect’s phone incident to arrest. 200 These courts reached this
conclusion because it seemed compelled by existing precedent: an
officer can search any “containers” found on a suspect’s person,
and a cell phone is a container.201 But a cell phone is distinct in
many ways from other containers (like a backpack, for example):
cell phones contain much more information, and that information
can be highly personal.202 Nevertheless, many circuits, recognizing the privacy interests at stake, concluded that under stare decisis, they could not reach a different holding.203 As technology
evolves, tensions will continue to build as old legal doctrines are
applied to new problems. Due to limitations like stare decisis,
courts are constrained in ways that legislatures are not, and thus
are not as well positioned to regulate rapidly evolving technology
as legislatures are.
Legislatures have other advantages as well: they are more
democratically accountable than courts are. As a result, they may
be better positioned to make the difficult value trade-offs inherent
in regulating digital searches. 204 Moreover, legislatures can experiment with different ways to make these trade-offs. Different
states with varying value preferences can choose to express those
preferences with different statutory schemes. 205 Federalism

199 See Kerr, 102 Mich L Rev at 807 (cited in note 188) (“Legislatures can enact comprehensive rules based on expert input and can update them frequently as technology
changes.”).
200 See, for example, United States v Flores-Lopez, 670 F3d 803, 806 (7th Cir 2012);
United States v Finley, 477 F3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir 2007); United States v Wurie, 612 F
Supp 2d 104, 110 (D Mass 2009), affd, 728 F3d 1 (1st Cir 2013), affd as consolidated in
Riley v California, 573 US 353 (2014).
201 See, for example, Flores-Lopez, 670 F3d at 806.
202 See Riley, 573 US at 393–95.
203 See, for example, Flores-Lopez, 670 F3d at 806–08; Wurie, 612 F Supp 2d at 110.
204 See Kerr, 102 Mich L Rev at 858–60 (cited in note 188).
205 See generally Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply
the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from
Unreasonable Search, 55 Cath U L Rev 373 (2006).
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famously creates laboratories of democracy. By contrast, variation is more of a bug than a feature of the federal judiciary: there
is only one Fourth Amendment after all. Given the inherent uncertainty around the future of technology and the best way to
manage rapid change, a mechanism that facilitates experimentation may be better suited to regulate digital devices. Recognizing
this, Justice Samuel Alito has joined lower courts in asking legislators to step in and resolve Fourth Amendment questions raised
by changing technologies: “Legislation is much preferable to the
development of an entirely new body of Fourth Amendment
caselaw for many reasons, including the enormous complexity of
the subject, the need to respond to rapidly changing technology,
and the Fourth Amendment’s limited scope.”206
D. Salvaging the Second-Order Approach
While it is unlikely that the courts’ current approach will motivate executive or legislative policymaking, courts should not
abandon their commitment to second-order regulation. To incentivize legislative actors to regulate digital searches, this Comment argues that courts should adopt a penalty default rule. As
discussed in Part IV.A, penalty default rules that disadvantage
police departments have effectively catalyzed legislative action in
the past. This Comment argues that courts should learn from
these successes and eliminate the plain view doctrine during
searches of digital devices until policymakers narrow the scope of
digital searches. This Section first explains why temporarily banning the plain view doctrine is possible. It then goes on to explain
why doing so is normatively desirable.
1. Courts can eliminate the plain view doctrine for digital
searches.
Courts can eliminate the plain view doctrine in the context of
digital searches because doing so is consistent with the rationale
for the exception. As explained in Part I.A, when the Supreme
Court first articulated the plain view doctrine, it made clear that
the doctrine was intended to be a narrow exception to the warrant
requirement. It was never supposed to enable an officer to engage
in “a general exploratory search from one object to another until

206 Carpenter v United States, 138 S Ct 2206, 2261 (2018) (Alito dissenting). See also
Riley, 573 US at 407–08 (Alito concurring).
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something incriminating at last emerges.” 207 However, because
courts have interpreted the Particularity Clause to allow an officer with a warrant to search a digital device to look at everything on that device, the plain view doctrine is no longer a narrow
exception. Instead, it enables officers to engage in the very
behavior that the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized is
unconstitutional.
A court can eliminate a judicially constructed exception that
contributes to unconstitutional searches. The Supreme Court has
done this before in the context of searches incident to arrest. The
search incident to arrest doctrine is an exception to the warrant
requirement: after an arrest, an officer is able to search a suspect
and the suspect’s belongings. But, in Riley, the Court eliminated
the exception in the context of cell phones.208 The Court concluded
that allowing an officer to search a suspect’s cell phone incident
to arrest would be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment:
cell phones contain far too much highly sensitive personal information. Given the unique problems that digital searches pose,
courts should similarly restrict the scope of the plain view doctrine and temporarily prohibit the application of the doctrine to
searches of digital devices.
Permanently eliminating the plain view doctrine in the context of digital searches has gained some traction among scholars
and courts. Kerr first tentatively proposed eliminating the plain
view doctrine in 2005.209 He argued that the plain view doctrine
should not be applicable in digital searches because it was too
powerful a tool in the age of big data for many of the reasons discussed in Part I.B.2.210 Other commentators, taking a less absolutist view, have also embraced the general principle that the
plain view doctrine is too powerful when applied to digital
searches as they are presently regulated.211 Then in 2009, the proposal to eliminate the plain view doctrine from digital searches
was briefly considered by a circuit court. In CDT II, the Ninth

207 Horton v California, 496 US 128, 136 (1990), quoting Coolidge v New Hampshire,
403 US 443, 466 (1971) (Stewart) (plurality).
208 See Riley, 573 US at 403.
209 See Kerr, 119 Harv L Rev at 582–84 (cited in note 9).
210 See id.
211 See, for example, David C. Behar, Note, An Exception to an Exception: Officer Inadvertence as a Requirement to Plain View Seizures in the Computer Context, 66 U Miami
L Rev 471, 493 (2012) (proposing an inadvertence requirement for plain view computer
searches); Moshirnia, Note, 23 Harv J L & Tech at 626–29 (cited in note 9) (proposing a
crime-based balancing test for the exception).
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Circuit, sitting en banc, endorsed Kerr’s view and required officers to “forswear reliance” on the plain view doctrine.212 While the
circuit subsequently relegated this idea to advisory status,213 the
legal environment in which it was embraced has not changed significantly. Digital searches are just as broad in scope, and the
same Fourth Amendment risks exist.
While such a temporary ban on invoking the plain view doctrine in digital searches might seem radical, similar penalty default rules have been employed by the Supreme Court in the past.
For example, in Barker v Wingo, the Supreme Court held that if
a defendant is not given a speedy trial, the Sixth Amendment is
violated.214 But rather than remedy the constitutional violation
through direct regulation, the Court adopted a default rule that
was particularly undesirable for the government: an indictment
must be dismissed if a defendant is not given a speedy trial.215
Concerned that defendants who would otherwise be convicted
would go free under Barker, Congress acted by passing the federal
Speedy Trial Act.216 The Act replaced the diffuse standard that
Barker created with a set of rules that courts had to follow. In
other words, the Court’s adoption of a penalty default rule motivated the legislature to regulate criminal procedure.217
Another example of a radical penalty default rule is the Supreme Court’s decision in Colorado v Bertine.218 In Bertine, the
Supreme Court banned police departments from conducting inventory searches until they adopted uniform policies that regulated those types of searches.219 Inventory searches are very important to law enforcement: police officers need to be able to
search cars that they impound for safety reasons as well as law
enforcement needs. Not wanting to forgo this useful tool, police
departments across the country ensured that they had policies
that sufficiently restricted their inventory searches. 220 Both of
these examples illustrate that temporarily adopting rules with

212 CDT II, 579 F3d at 998. See also id at 1006 (listing all the requirements for a
digital search).
213 See generally United States v Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc, 621 F3d 1162 (9th
Cir 2010) (CDT III).
214 See Barker, 407 US at 522.
215 See id.
216 See note 92 and accompanying text.
217 See Mikkilineni, Note, 82 NYU L Rev at 1411–12 (cited in note 11).
218 479 US 367 (1987).
219 See id at 374 n 6.
220 See id. See also Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 221 (cited in note 5).
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negative law enforcement consequences to incentivize policymakers to act is not as radical as it might initially seem.
2. Eliminating the plain view doctrine for digital searches
is desirable.
While such decisions are rare, the Supreme Court has endorsed radical approaches when the severity of the problem warrants it. And the problem of overbroad digital searches is one that
certainly warrants such action.221 Unless policymakers act, a single warrant to search our digital devices will continue to give officers access to much of the data we produce on a daily basis. And
given our increasing reliance on digital devices, such expansive
access poses a significant threat to both our privacy and autonomy interests. Therefore, while the rules that legislatures
enact may not be perfect, they certainly will be better than the
status quo.
This rule—a temporary ban on using the plain view doctrine
in digital searches—will be more effective than the existing default rules at incentivizing legislatures to act because it disrupts
the policing status quo in a way that disadvantages law enforcement interests. As discussed in Part I.B.2, the plain view doctrine
is an extremely powerful tool that officers can wield when searching digital devices. The doctrine allows officers to use any immediately incriminating evidence they discover when searching a
laptop or phone. Without it, officers would be severely circumscribed in their ability to benefit from incriminating evidence that
was not listed in a warrant. Because the plain view exception is
so central to digital searches, a rule that prevents officers from
relying on the plain view doctrine until such searches are regulated will cause police departments and their associated interest
groups to lobby legislatures for the necessary regulation.
Some may worry that police departments may be too effective
at lobbying, and the resulting legislative solution will be skewed
toward law enforcement interests. This has occurred in the past.
A famous example is the USA PATRIOT Act.222 Following the 9/11
terrorist attacks, the Act was rushed through Congress due to
strong lobbying from law enforcement advocates.223 It contained a
number of controversial provisions that tried to make fighting
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See Part I.B.
Pub L No 107-56, 115 Stat 272 (2001).
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terrorism easier at the expense of privacy interests.224 However,
the ultimate fate of the PATRIOT Act illustrates what can happen if legislation enables broad surveillance. When the public
learned that provisions of the Act enabled the federal government
to engage in massive surveillance of their telephone calls (known
as the telephony metadata program), the ensuing outrage prevented the program from ultimately being reauthorized. While
other provisions of the Act were renewed, public sentiment prevented the program from continuing.225 Given the ubiquity of digital devices in everyday life, it is conceivable that a regulatory
scheme that allowed police officers to engage in generalized
searches of digital devices would face similar widespread
hostility.
Furthermore, this provision does not eliminate the role of the
federal judiciary entirely. Courts should still operate as a check
on police practices that clearly violate the Fourth Amendment—
even those sanctioned by law. 226 Under existing federal circuit
court precedent, police officers have to reasonably tailor their
searches to find only what is specified in the warrant.227 A regulatory regime that did not require police officers to tailor their
searches in this manner would violate the Fourth Amendment. In
this way, judicial review will act as a backstop preventing
truly privacy-invasive policy regimes from being enacted by
legislatures.228
Of course, an easy response to this proposal is to point out the
risk that the legislature will not respond to the penalty default

224 See generally Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT
Act, 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1145 (2004).
225 See Jennifer Steinhauer and Jonathan Weisman, US Surveillance in Place Since
9/11 Is Sharply Limited (NY Times, June 2, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/GNM8
-PNRB.
226 While some scholars have argued that legislation should alter the constitutional
standard, this Comment does not do so. Instead, it argues that courts should incentivize
legislatures to act consistently with what courts judge to be the constitutional principle.
Here, the constitutional principle is that searches must be narrowly tailored to find only
what is specified in the warrant. For a discussion about the merits and drawbacks of having courts adjust constitutional standards based on legislative action or inaction, see generally Orin S. Kerr, The Effect of Legislation on Fourth Amendment Protection, 115 Mich
L Rev 1117 (2017).
227 See Part I.C.
228 That said, this Comment recognizes that it may be difficult for a court to know
whether a given regulatory scheme sufficiently requires an officer to tailor search protocols to the objectives specified in a warrant. To some extent, it will require the court to
make the same trade-offs between privacy and law enforcement interests that it is hesitant to do now.
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rule at all—or if they do, legislatures will take years to forge a
compromise that can be passed into law. Such a delay would effectively mean that the temporary elimination of the plain view
doctrine from digital searches will become a permanent ban due
to legislative inaction. For the reasons explained in Part IV.A,
such an outcome is unlikely. But if it does occur, there is reason
to conclude that permanently banning the plain view doctrine is
not as untenable of a solution as one might initially fear.
First, banning the plain view doctrine prevents officers from
being incentivized to conduct overly broad searches. As Kerr argues, “it would allow the police to conduct whatever search they
needed to conduct (to ensure recovery) and then limit use of the
evidence found (to deter abuses).”229 Furthermore, police officers
can still rely on the independent source and inevitability doctrines to utilize incriminating evidence that is outside the scope
of a warrant.230 Under these two doctrines, evidence can be admitted in court when the police officer had either an independent way
to obtain the information or when the officer would have discovered the same evidence irrespective of the warrantless search.231
While these two doctrines would not apply in every situation, they
would at least mitigate the impact of the plain-view ban in some
scenarios.
CONCLUSION
Fourth Amendment doctrine as it has been applied to physical searches is unable to manage the unique threat that digital
searches pose to privacy. While these doctrines may adequately
balance privacy interests against law enforcement needs in an analog environment, they do not do so in a digital one. In the absence
of effective constitutional safeguards, a warrant to search a digital device enables the police to indiscriminately rummage
through your data for evidence of criminal activity—the exact
harm that the Fourth Amendment was adopted to prevent.232
To combat this problem, commentators have focused on ways
that courts can modify existing Fourth Amendment doctrine to
better protect our privacy interests. But few commentators have
229
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grappled with the reality that most courts are simply not interested in directly regulating digital searches. While courts
acknowledge the real problems that digital searches pose, they do
not feel well equipped to get into the minutiae of digital search
procedures.
Instead, courts have asked legislatures to step in and directly
regulate digital searches. Unfortunately, this request for legislative intervention is likely to go unanswered. Judges have undercut their pleas for assistance by fashioning default rules that reflect existing privacy-invasive police practices. Because these
rules reflect the status quo, legislators will be unlikely to expend
the political capital necessary to replace the default rules with
alternatives.
To incentivize nonjudicial policymaking, courts should adopt
a penalty default rule that is viewed as untenable by institutional
actors. Specifically, courts should temporarily ban officers from
invoking the plain view exception during digital searches until
nonjudicial policymakers adopt alternative policies that narrow
the scope of digital searches. While such an approach seems radical, it reflects the gravity of the privacy problem we face. In the
digital age, our lives are increasingly dominated by our devices.
In 2018, one study reported that 90 percent of the world’s data
was created in the last two years.233 All this information is stored
on our digital devices. Access to these devices therefore provides
a highly intimate picture of our lives. Until we limit the ability of
the government to search through our data, our personal privacy
in the digital age is under threat.

233 See Bernard Marr, How Much Data Do We Create Every Day? The Mind-Blowing
Stats Everyone Should Read (Forbes, May 21, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/729P
-6WHL.

